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AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE OCEANS

RICHARD N. COOPER"

Introduction

Management of the oceans has become a highly pressing issue in
the face of .continuously improving technology and relentlessly growing
population. The existence, size, and complexity of the United Nations Law
of the Sea Conferences in 1974 and 197 5 testify both to the importance of
and to the difficulties involved in introducing better management into a
global arena where relatively little management has existed previously.
My assignment is to indicate how one economist, not an expert on
oceans or any of its particular aspects, looks at this relatively new range of
issues and what guidance he would offer for future management of the
resources of the oceans. It is in many ways a presumptuous undertaking,
but as I scan the positions that have been taken to date on management of
the oceans I believe it may also be a useful undertaking, for in a number of
respects it seems to me that the participants in the process of working out
a new law of the sea have lost sight of several important considerations, and
in some instances have neglected their own best interests.

*Frank Altschul Professor of International Economics, Yale Univ
ersity, New Haven, Connecticut.

SUGGESTED PERSPECTIVE

Let me begin with some remarks
on the perspective that I adopt, for in many ways it will appear to be un
realistic. First, I will try to adopt a cosmopolitan, or global, perspective.
Second, I will be concerned with maximizing the benefits the world derives
from its use of ocean resources as indicated by the contribu tion they make
to world output, properly measured. This emphasis on using the world's
resources as efficiently as possible is one that the large majority of econo
mists would recognize and, I believe, would generally approve except on
grounds of technical infeasibility or dissatisfaction with the distribu tion of
income that they fear might result.
·
Efficiency in the use of resources is not everything we wish for,
and economists recognize the existence and importance of other social goals,
such as ·~ ·sense of participation in decision-making, security in enjoyme nt
of one's standard of living, reductio n of unwanted risk, perceived justice
in the distribution of income, and so on. But other things being equal,
efficiency is desirable so long as the world's resources are limited. The
very scramble now going on over ocean resources suggests that resources
are very scarce, as do world inflation (which in its origins reflects a col
lective attempt to consume more than the world is producing) and myriad
national conflicts over the distribution of income. We cannot yet afford
waste. If we are to elect an inefficient solution to allocation of the ocean's
resources, we should be sure that we get a great deal for it in terms of our
other social objectives. Having in mind the benefits of efficient manage ment,
even if they are not fully attainab le, will help in assessing the costs of
attaining such other objectives and also of such political compromises as may
be made to reach agreement.
All this may seem platitud inous, but I have seen too many cases
where policymakers feel obliged to agree to suboptimal policies because of
so-called political constraints. Their advisers in turn confine themselves to
trying to understand and reconcile the various expressed interests , treating
policy formatio n as a quasi-adversary process among those who show an
interest in the subject and in the end recommending least common denomi
nator compromises among conflicting objectives, with little or no consistency
in approac h, nothing to build on in. the future, and neglect of consider
ations and relevant parties (such as consumers) which failed to make it into
the arena where compromise was hammered out.
I Compromises, even not very promising compromises, are of
course a necessary part of the political process. Where objectives of differen t
·parties really do conflict, politicians often find ambiguity and tempori zing
desirable. But the role of policy advisers is dfferent from that of poli
ticians. Advisers should try to sharpen the issues and to minimize the
extent of real conflict, which is often less than meets the eye. Rationa l
manage ment can often make all parties better off if enough effort is put
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into framing it. Moreover, proposals for rational management of an issue
can guide the efforts of policymakers, both in gathering information that
would be necessary for persuading the various parties to accept rational
managemen t, and in directing such compromises as have to be made toward
ones that can over time be shaped into rational management, rather than
ones which will aggravate conflict in the future. In this way a basis can be
laid for a consistent and efficient long run program.
Moreover, today's "political realities" often change with remark
able speed in the presence of new circumstances or new informatio n-even
as a result of persuasion. The role of leadership in policy formation, in
cluding the education of political constituencies, is not yet\ dead. In the
areas of internation al monetary reform, strong "political realities" against
the intro<l'uction of Special Dr2.wing Rights and the adoption of flexible ex
change rates dropped away quickly, partly as a result of new circumstances,
partly as a reS'lllt of persuasion.
These general introductor y remarks on the perspective and on the
role of policy advisers are pertinent to the oceans at the present time. Many
issues are unfolding at once, and there are many conflicting positions. Eco
nomic analysis can illuminate the issues and help to separate the apparent
conflict from the inevitable real conflict that is present when resources are
scarce. What I propose below are some principles for making the most
efficient use of the ocean's resources, with strong cognizance of the need for
better distribution of income in the world. The proposals will be viewed by
many as utopian, but, like much normative economic analysis, they reflect
a ra_her down-to-earth utopianism.
CHARACTE RISTICS OF THE OCEANS AS A RESOURCE\ Thirty yea~s
ago, the oceans could be characterized as a common property resource whose
surface was used for maritime transportat ion and which served as a medium
for fish and whales, which could be caught if they could be found. Many
minerals were known to reside both within the sea and underneath it, but
they were virtually inaccessible. During the intervening period human
pressure on the oceans increased enormously , so that what was once an
apparently inexhaustible resource, relative to the technology then available
and the capi,tal we found it profitable to devote to exploiting it, is rapidly
becoming a scarce resource. Already before the Second World War certain
fishing areas and certain species were over fished~ Now that problem has
spread to dozens of species, and in addition we are concerned with the
density of shipping (giving rise both to more collisions and to more pollution)
and the extraction of minerals from the seabed. The oceans have long been
used as a disposal medium for human wastes, but again the growing density
of human settlement and the rise in human consumptio n are increasingly
"using up" what was once a genuinely free resource. Fertilizers, pesticides,

and before long, atomic waste materials will have grown in quantity to the
point of exceeding the natural absorptive capacity of the oceans. Finally,
to complicate further any policy to allocate the various increasingly scarce
resources of the oceans, they have become the leading medium, ahead of the
atmosphere, in maintenance of strategic balance between the nuclear super
powers.
Once fish become overfished, once waste materials cease to be
!absorbed before they do damage, once maritime passageways become crowded
with ships, what was once a free resource becomes scarce. It takes on value.
In economic terms,it commands a scarcity rent. 1 Efficient use of the oceans
then requires limiting access to those who are willing to pay this rent.
If the rent is not actually charged, but the scarcity value is present,
what happens to it? It gets dissipated in one way or another, through wasted
resource~.· In the case of fisheries, there is more investment of capital and
labor than is needed to harvest the fish that are harvested. Some of the
social costs of each additional vessel are imposed on other vessels through
higher costs of fishing, due to the reduction of the population (stock) of
fish. S. J. Holt reports that the harvest of cod in the northeast Atlantic
under proper management could be taken with only half of the effort
currently expended, resulting in annual savings of $150 million or more;
and Crutchfield and Pontecorvo have estimated that the rent dissipated
through excessive costs amounted in the late fifties to 83 per cent of the
value of the salmon catch in Bristol Bay, off southwest Alaska. 2 These are
enormous losses. Waste disposal in excess of the absorptive capacity of the
oceans becomes "pollution" and imposes costs on all those I who use the
polluted water, from those who like ocean beaches and sea birds to those who
would like ocean fish if they were not contaminated by mercury or DDT.
The costs can be very diffuse but still be costs nonetheless. Shipping con
gestion has not yet reached the level of congestion at the world's airports,
but it has reached the point at which the risks of collision have risen sub
stantially and therefore each additional ship imposes a cost on other i shippers.
the costs of collision-avoidance measures and insurance, and the actual (un
insured) losses if collision does occur.
In the case of minerals, the scarcity rent (if any) is captured by
the entrepreneur who engages in extraction, or (in the case of oil) it may
get dissipated through excessive drilling on a common oil pool, or (where
jurisdiction is established) it is paid to a government in the form of licensing
fees and royalties.

Contemporary Resources of the Sea

In what follows, I propose to analyze the case of ocean fisheries

in some detail, because of the importance of fisheries and because of their
relatively longer history of attempts to limit access. Similar principles
apply to poliution and to maritime shipping. Seabed minerals raise somew·hat
different issues, which will be discussed after the other three areas of
concern.
OCEAN FISHERIE S
It has become conventional to characterize a fishery stock of fish that is capable of reproducing itself at a rate that,
among other things, depends upon the size of the stock, with the rate of
growth fast rising and then falling as the stock becomes larger and eventual
ly presses against the ecological limits for that particular species or group of
species. Commercial fishing "creams off" part or all of the annual yield of
the stock and possibly even some of the stock itself. In the last case, the
stock of-course declines. The cost of fishing depends among other things
on the size of the stock. For any given technology and fishing effort, the
cost per ton of fish harvested is lower, the larger is the stock. On these
assumptions, and given a high commercial value of the fish relative to the
cost of fishing, there will be a tendency under free! access to the fishery for
the stock to be overfished, i.e., it will be fished to the point at which the
reduced stock increases fishing costs per unit catch enough to deter further
entry.3 Rising relative prices for the fish and/or technological improvements
in fishing will lead to further depletion of the stock.
This result is economically inefficient, in the sense that the same
harvest of fish could be acquired at lower economic cost if the stock in the
fishery were more carefully managed. Whether it is desirable to reduce
harvests for the purpose of increasing the stock of fish depends on whether
the "rate of return" on reduced harvests now for the sake of lower harvesting
costs later equals or exceeds the rate of return on other forms of investment,
i.e., in principle the decision whether or not to rebuild depleted stocks is
similar to other investment decisions. It might be the case that operating a
fishery on a low stock, high cost basis is economically efficient by virtue of
the social benefits flowing from the initial larger-than-sustainable harvests
that reduced the stock. This result is especially likely if the social rate of
discount is high, i.e., if society gives great preference to the present over the
future.4
But let us assume, what is probably the case for most fisheries at
real rates of interest prevailing in the world in recent years, thati the depletion
of fish stocks through unregulated fishing was socially a mistake and[occurred
because ,of the failure of individual fishermen in reckoning their own costs
to take into account their adverse 1effect on total harvesting costs. Suppose
therefore that it doe~ make economic sense to rebuild the stock. How is
that to be accomplished? Somehow the harvest must be reduced for a

period of time. The standard way to do this is to impose harvest quotas and
and to limit the length of the fishing season. Technological improvements
in fishing may also be restricted. These efforts will increase the stock (or
prevent its further depletion), but as they do so prices of the fish will rise
and costs of fishing will fall. The tendency of costs to fall and of prices to
to rise, however, will attract new entrants and encourage investment in
improved harvesting efficiency -especially aimed at speed of harvesting if
quotas are on a first come, first served basis-both of which are socially
unwarranted but privately profitable. Otherwise the profits (which are
really scarcity rents, not rewards to genuine entrepreneurial effort and risk
taking) accrue to those lucky enough to have been awarded the quotas.
To encourage efficiency in the use of the fishery, it is necessary to
prevent the rents on the fishery from influencing entry and investment.
Indeed, sqme disinvestment from the initial overfished condition will gener
ally be required (this will occur automatically through time as fishermen
retire and their ships and boats age). One way of inhibiting new entry and
investment is to levy a charge on all those who use the fishery, based on the
size of the catch. The appropriate royalty per pound of fish would vary in
versely with the size of the stock, i.e., it would be high for an overfished
stock in order to facilitate rebuilding; it would be lower for an optimally
managed stock. It may also be appropriate to impose limits on the size (as a
proxy for age) of fish caught, to maximize the productive capacity of a
given stock of fish, but these regulations will not generally represent an
adequate substitute for a royalty charge. Levying such a charge on the
world's ocean fisheries would of course generate revenue, a prospect to
which I return below.
It is often suggested that we should strive for a "maximum sus
tainable yield" from each fishery, a biological concept of the maximum
harvest attainable in a given ecological environment without depleting the
stock. (Efforts may also be devoted to improving the ecological environ
ment so the "maximum sustainable yield" is enlarged, and for some fish
eries this approach seems very promising, provided entry can be limited.)
In general, however, this target will result in too small a stock of fish for
efficient use of resources. The maximum sustainable yield criterion ignores
the fact that labor and capital must be devoted to harvesting the fish, and
that the cost per unit catch will be lower, the larger is the stock of fish.
Thus optimal management of a fishery generally calls for a larger stock of
fish than would be required for maximum sustainable yield, to help con
serve on the other resources _required to harvest the fish. 5 Unrestricted
access to the fishery will result in a smaller stock of commercially valuable
fish than that required for maximum sustainable yield. From this starting
point, therefore, the direction of the desired change is clear: to rebuild the
the stock through reduction of harvesting below the sustainable yield,

_provided the "return" on this investment equals or exceeds that on other
investments. Moreover, since our knowledge about the characteristics of
most fisheries, and in particular about the relationships between stocks,
yields, and costs of harvesting, is inexact,• I would propose at this stage
that we strive for maximum sustainable yield, but that in our calculations
of what that yield is and what charge is required to achieve it, we deliber
ately select from within the range of values those that lead to a higher
stock. In other words, we should err on the high side.
An attempt to maximize the revenues from royalty charges, i.e.,
treating the fishery as a monopoly, will result in still a larger stock and
lower output, except in the limiting case in which the price of the harvest
from a particular fishery is beyond influence of output from that fishery.
But that would introduce an inefficiency of the opposite kind: under
µtilization-of a scarce resource. It should therefore be avoided.
·
· To sum up for fisheries: they differ from most resources in that
their efficient management calls for restriction of access to .the fisheries.
These restrictions in turn can be made to generate revenue, in contrast to
the more usual situation in which generating tax revenue involves inter
ference with the efficient use of resources. To find an efficient source of
revenue therefore is not an opportunity to be dismissed lightly. Moreover,
the total amount of revenue that might be generated from the ocean fisheries
of the world is consequential: a rough calculation would put the amount of
rents that might be captured at around $2.5 billion under present circum
tances. Thi.s amounts to five times the recent annual disbursements of the
International Development Association, the leading source of development
assistance on very easy terms, and to over twice the annual disbursements
of the World Bank. Moreover, the yield might be trebled as the world's
fisheries are brought increasingly under intense exploitation 6 and to even
higher amounts if the price of animal protein rises relative to other prices.
Because ,of the importance of enlarging the economical sources
of animal protein, there is a global interest in good management of the
world's fisheries wherever they are located. Thus, there is serious/ question
whether management should be left exclusively to individual coastal states.
My impression, which would have to be confirmed by further research, is
that nations have not done an outstanding job of managing those fisheries
that fall exclusively within their jurisdiction. Indeed, it has been suggested
that such limited success as we have had at fisheries management has come
largely through international agreement rather than through exclusive na
tional control.6 In any case, it certainly cannot be taken for granted that
establishment of national proprietorship over coastal fisheries out, say, to
· 200 miles will result in rational management.
An alternative institutional arrangement for management of ocean
fisheries outside traditional territorial waters would involve: the establishment

on international comm1ss1ons for each ocean fish_erv that has been or is
in danger of being overfished. Each commission would have a certain degree
of autonomy, but would be tied in with a global organization such as the
FAO for general policy guidance and for technical expertise in projecting
prices and costs and in determining the ecological characteristics of each
fishery. 7 Each commission, with global representation, would have responsi
bility for gathering detailed information on its fishery, for establishing
appropriate fees for exploitation of the fishery, for establishing rules on
allowable gear, and for policing proper use of the fishery.
In all cases the guidelines would be to maximize the economic
yield of the fishery, thereby permitting gear restrictions to encourage growth
and reproduction of the fish, for example, but not to limit improvements in
fishing techniques. Technologically traditional coastal fishermen-bas ically
those still operating in a subsistence economy-mig ht be excluded from
payment of the catch royalties; and special arrangements, discussed further
below, might be necessary for aiding existing fishermen during the tran
sition to optimally managed fishermen.
Of the three other topics requiring discussion here, pollution,
navigation, and seabed minerals, the first two can be handled briefly, for,
surprising as it may seem, the conceptual issues are similar to those for
fisheries-at least at the high level of generalization which I am using, and
with the exception of strategic considerations for navigation, discussed
briefly below.
POLLUTION OF THE OCEANS
Pollution involves the deliberate
and inadvertent use of the oceans as a waste disposal medium in a way that
imposes costs, real and aesthetic, on other users of the ocean. The sources
of pollution are many: river runoffs of fertilizers and pesticides and in
dustrial wastes, direct emission of urban sewage, petroleum from offshore
drilling or from the cleaning of ships' tanks or from damaged ships. The
oceans comprise a vast depository and can absorb. much waste material
indeed, they have been absorbing nature's waste material for millenia
without damage arid sometimes with great benefit, as when organisms feeding
on river effluents and other waste comprise an important link in the food
chain or when heat emissions alter the marine environment in a productive
fashion. But the emission of waste can also have damaging local effects
both to sea life and to human well-being, and in some cases, long lasting,
long distance effects have been identified, especially from toxic chemicals
(DDT and mercury compounds), radiocative materials, and even oil. 8 We
need more analysis, including reasoned speculative analysis of the effects
of ocean pollution. Where the external effects are negative and substantial
and where compensation to the losers is difficult either because they cannot
be clearly identified or because the offenders cannot be clearly identified

(as might be the case with slow mercury poisoning thruogh consumption of
fish, for example), prohibit ory regulations may be required. In other cases,
liability should be clearly established and stiff fines for damage should be
institute d. This course seems preferable to laying down specific behavioral
requirem ents, e.g., for the construc tion of tankers, for it leaves to potentia l
offenders an incentive to find the least-cost ways of avoiding the continge nt
losses to them should an accident occur.
There is an obvious connect ion between waste disposal in the
oceans and ocean fisheries; certain kinds of disposal may devastate a fishery,
while others may actually be beneficial. In the former case, it would be
natural to empower the fishery commissions recommended above to negoti
ate with damaging sources of pollutio n either to desist or to compen sate
for damage done to fishery. Procedures for adjudication of disputes between
national .authorities and the commissions should also be established: One
possible outcome is that the polluters would be willing to pay more for the
use of a given disposal area than it is worth as a fishery, and financial com
promises between the two conflicting uses are of course possible, based on
the marginal social benefit of each activity. This would represent another ,
more modest, source of revenue for the international commun ity.9
SHIPPING
The world's merchan t fleets nearly doubled in
number of ships between 1951 and 1971, and merchant tonnage nearly
quadrup led. Both the average size and the average speed of merchan t ships
rose, so that larger ships covered more rpiles in any given period of time.
The great growth in ship-miles travelled has increased congestion in the
world's shipping lanes, and the larger size has increased both the probabi 
lity of collision (because of reduced maneuverability) and the cost of
collision.: A number of dramatic incidents have occurred in recent years, in
cluding increased numbers of groundings as well as collisions, and for the
same reasons. Shipping accidents have grown with the volume of shipping
and have reached the point at which on average a 50,000 ton ship sinks every

day.

.

As with free access to fisheries, free access to shipping lanes, once

they become crowded, imposes costs on other users which ship entering the
lane does not bear directly. Congestion externalities do not yet seem to be
a major problem for shipping except in some ports and in a few straits,
such as the English Channel and the Straits of Malacca. Moreover, such
congest ion as has occurred can be alleviated by laying dovm stricter rules of
the road and providing better navigational aids, as the British government
has done in the English Channel. 1 0
Although ship captains will not like the intrusion on their tra
ditional ly wide prerogative, it will become increasingly necessary to instruct
them where to move in congested areas, as is done today with aircraft.

Moreover, if some lanes become very crowded, it will be desirable to charge
"congestion fees'' on ships entering the lanes, not merely to pay to navi
gational aids, but specifically for the purpose of limiting congestion. Again
major airports offer a precedent, as do fees for transiting some canals Such
fees would provide yet another source of revenue.· Congestion fees are not
likely to be warranted on any of the ocean sea lanes for some time, however,
and tighter traffic control and better navigational aids will postpone the day
even further.
As with waste disposal, it would be possz'ble to charge monopoly
rents for passage through certain straits, and indeed levying charges on
passafe has been a common source of revenue for local rulers through the
ages. 1 ~ut so long as the passages are not congested, such charges cause a
misallocation of resources by discouraging some potential users from using
the passage in question. Like tariffs, they create an artificial impediment
to trade. They should therefore be avoided.
,
MINERALS FROM THE SEABED
Exploiting minerals on or under
the seabed poses a somewhat different analytical problem than management
of fisheries, pollution, and shipping. The scarcity rents in these latter cases
can be dissipated through unimpeded access, and good management requires
some limitation on access, such as a royalty on fishing harvests. With deep
sea minerals, on the other hand, we want to encourage as much exploitation
as is economic, by as many parties as possible (to ensure competition).
Making the best use of the world's resources calls for maximum economic
exploitation. Therefore we do not want to impose impediments to ex
ploitation of the seabed, except those that are required to offset the negative
external effects such as ecological damage to fisheries, over-working a given
oil pool, interference with shipping, and the like.
The clear implication is that restricting entry and charging stiff
royalties on minerals extracted from under the oceans may not be a good
idea from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. That observation must be
coupled with the observation that mineral industries often do generate
scarcity rents. They do so whenever the source of supply is more economical
than the "marginal" or highest cost source of supply of the mineral in
question, after allowance for transport costs to the leading markets. Where
these rents exist, they can in principle be taxed away without loss to eco
nomic efficiency. The problem is to identify them. It is not clear that
there will in fact be substantial rents on seabed mining, which at least in
its early stages will be a very expensive activity. We should not count on
substantial revenues from this source until we have greater knowledge about
the economics of such mining. Premature imposition of license fees might
discourage what is a desirable activity .1 2
The revenues that seem to be available from 'exploitation of these

resources appear to be vast-a nd they may in the end prove to be
vast. An
estimated two-thirds of offshore oil reserves lie beyon d present territo
rial
waters. At $5 a barrel an annual production of 8 billion barrels of
such oil
would yield $40 billion. But the costs of extracting such oil must
not be
neglected, and the "rents " may be nowhere close to $5 a barrel. North
Sea
extrac tion costs are proving to be substantially greater than expect ed,
and no
doubt in the next several years higher cost off-loading facilities in the
major
consuming areas will (and sholhd) be required to reduce the chance
s of
polluti on.
An adapta tion of the approach that has alread y been applied in
the oil indust ry offers a reasonable approach to the extrac tion of
scarcity
rents that may not exist. Prospectors should be allowed to undert
ake as
much explor ation and preliminary survey work on attract ive areas
as they
like, and' additio nal survey work should be undert aken by (intern
ational)
public author ities. Then prospectors would be permi tted to bid
for ex
tractio n rights on specified sites, the term of the lease to be for a
suitably
long period of time as long as the site is worked. Under compe titive
bidding,
the auction price should come close to the present value of any
scarcity
rents on a given site, on the basis of present knowledge about future
costs
and prices and the availability and ease of extraction of minerals
from the
site in question. Such auctions, based on sealed bids, have been
used
successfully for offsho re drilling rights in the United States , and for
drilling
rights in Alaska, generating substantial revenues for public author ities.
Present knowledge is of course limited, and the value of a givert
field may prove to be substantially less or more than appear ed
to be the
case at the time of auctio n, or other circumstances in the indust
ry (e.g.,
the technology available) may change. To cover this contingency,
I the
leasing agency should also impose a profits tax on the firms engage
d in
extrac tion. In this fashion, the agency will share with the firm
any ex
ceptional earnings that were not anticipated at the time of the
!bidding.
Corpo rate profit taxes of around 50 per cent are normal in many countr
ies;
the profits tax in this activity might be somewhat higher, in view
of the
impor tant role which purely geological factors (as oppos ed, for
example,
to sales or marke ting efforts) play in the profitability of the activity.
Beyond
that, the world should not begrudge exceptional profits occasionally
accruing
to those extrac ting minerals from the seabed; that may be necess
ary to
encourage firms to invest their capital in the exceptional risks involv
ed.
I would be prepared to give some preference in the bidding to
newcomers to the indust ry in question, in the interests of increas
ing the
the extent of global compe tition. The amoun t of preference would
depen d
on the global structu re of the industry, varying from zero for a reason
ably
competitive indust ry to, say, 15 per cent for a highly conce ntrated
indust ry.
In general, access to the seabed should be as wide as possible.

Some less developed countries have expressed fears that mmmg
from the seabed will depress the prices of their important export products.
On the principles outlip.ed in the beginning of this paper, this concern is not
a legitimate ground for under-exploitation of seabed minerals. If that princi
ple were to have been widely applied throughout history, we would still be
living in a static, stone-age society. (The introduction of metals undercut
the use of stone!) Moreover, apart from petroleum and cobalt, the prospect
of consequential effects on prices seems at present to be small.
NATIONAL SECURITY
As far back as Adam Smith economists
have recognized that "defense is more important than opulence," or, in
modern ~erms, that prosperity is no substitute for security. They have also,
it is true,· been suspicious of the misuse of national defense arguments for
introdudng inefficiencies into the allocation of resources. But that is differ
ent from arguing that they have no validity. The bearing of national defense
considerations on management of the oceans is that at present strategic
deterrence rests mainly, and in the future perhaps exclusively, on missile
carrying submarines. The stakes are extremely high, and no action in the
oceans should be taken that would jeopardize that use. The proposals made
above are entirely consistent with freedom of movement for submarines,
except that submarines must be exempt from individual transit tolls on 'the
use of congested straits-should such tolls become desirable in the future.
Instead, the Soviet Union and the United States and any other country with
such submarines might reasonably be required to make annual payments for
unlimited use of the straits by their submerged submarines.

Distribution of Oceanic Rents
As noted above, fisheries reprseent one of the relatively few areas
where efficient management can be used to generate revenue, in addition
to the income that accrues to fishermen. Use of the oceans for waste dis
posal and for shipping may offer similar opportunities, but the scale is
smaller and more remote in time except for pollution of fisheries. In
addition, exploitation of seabed minerals will probably give rise to some
pure rents which could be taxed away without economic loss. There might
be no such rents; but more likely they will be substantial, particularly after
appropriate technologies have been developed and shaken dov.m. The history
of oil discovery suggests large rents, and at a minimum of normal profits tax
on corporate income arising from extraction of ocean resources might be
included here.
I take seriously the United Nations claim on the seabed as a
"common heritage of mankind," and indeed I would go further and extend

this claim to all the world's commons, including the entire ocean area beyond
territorial waters. We have an opportunity to delimit the process whereby
Nature's caprice in the location of resources provides unearned windfalls,
sometimes huge windfalls, to those who happen to be in proximity when the
resource becomes valuable through increases in demand or improvements in
technology.
Extension of this claim should not, in my view, mean detailed
United Nations regulation of the use of the oceans or the seabed. In most
instances detailed regulation is not warranted. What it does mean is that
any revenues above cost and fair return to investors arising from use of the
oceans or seabed should be used for internationally agreed purposes. That
is, the international community as a whole should hold title to the property,
but it should license freely the use rights, not monopolize them .
. There are many possible uses for the revenue, which as we have
seen above might be substantial, ieventually running into tens of billions of
dollars annually when fisheries, offshore petroleum, and seabed mining are
taken together. The first claim on these revenues would be management
costs, which should be a small portion of the total. The second claim would
be scientific research germane to efficient management. This is especially
important in the case of fisheries and pollution, where our ignorance of the
ecological relationships is still much too great for confident management;
but it also could be important in maximizing the returns from the seabed,
for the manganese nodules may only be the first of many extractive oppor
tunities.
The revenues remaining after these claims have been satisfied-and
they could be substantial---could then be used for a variety of common
purposes: budgetary support for the United Nations, which is frequently
strapped for funds; UN peace-keeping activities; and most b bviously, dev
elopment assistance to the poor countries of the world.
These arrangements seem to me far better for the world com
munity as a community than the current tendency of coastal states to grab
for 200 miles plus. It is also far better individually for all land-locked and
shelf and zone-locked countries, and for those really poor countries, such
as India and a number of African nations, that have extensive coastlines but
also are likely to benefit disproportionately but appropriately from the inter
national revenues arising under these arrangements. Persuasively developed,
they should appeal to many countries whose current position in the Law of
the Sea Conference does not seem to conform either with their national
economic interests or with the notion of a well~anaged global community.
This discussion has dealt with distribution of the revenue. But
what about distribution of the activity, e.g., who will actually do the mining
or the fishing? In today's world of extensive government planning and in
fluence on national economies, this is not as relevant a question as it might

at fisrt seem to be. Economic development is better served by maximizing
the revenue, that is, the net earnings, from each activity and then using the
revenue to employ labor in the most effective way, which will vary from
country to country. To allocate an activity such as fishing to inefficient
employers is to advocate waste, and I argued earlier that we cannot afford
waste in today's world. Where important market imperfections exist in the
·employment of labor or other resources-and there are many such imperfections in less developed countries, for that is one manifestation of their
lack of development-government efforts should be directed at reducing or
eliminating those imperfections, and a good source of revenue can help in
accomplishing that.

Translat£qn of Theory into Practice

To manage the world's oceans efficiently we need much more
information than we ·now have, although we made an important start; and
to assure equity we need to provide for a smooth transition to proper
management in those cases, such as fisheries, where extensive changes from
existing practices may be required.
The need for accurate scientific and economic information is hard
to over emphasize. One reason that debate over a fishery's management can
continue so long, and adequate regulation be so long postponed, is that firm
information on the relationship between fishing effort and the yield of the
fishing population is absent. I am struck by the parallel to the gradual ex
tension of international control over contagious diseases in the 19th century.
Nations squabbled endlessly over the best methods of controJ!, and the
theories of contagion that underlay them, until complete and cofrect scien
tific information on the mode of transmission and the incubation period of
each disease became available. Once that happened, international agreement
on regulation occurred relatively rapidly. With international common proper
ty, distribution of the gains will always be a potential source of conflict,
but how to maximize the gains should not be~ once we have adequate
knowledge. Thus much more effort should go into marine research. It is
distressing that marine research itself seems to have become a political
football: at the Law of the Sea Conference, an arena in which sovereign
rights are tested. Knowledge, even more than the oceans, should be common
property, and its acquisition should be subject to minimal impediment.
A5 for transitional arrangements, some provision should be made
for those who have already invested their capital and their training in fishing
particular fisheries, even those that are overfished. I would suggest that
harvest quotas be allocated on the basis of historical catches, with the total
quota set below the substantial harvest so that the stocks of overfished

fisheries can grow. New entry onto such fisheries would be prohibited
altogether for a specified period of time. As the fish population grows,
harvesting costs will fall, giving the historical fishermen some financial room
for readjustment. As the population approaches the optimum level, the
fishery could be opened to new entrants, subject to a harvest royalty that
would deter entry sufficiently for the population to continue to grow to
the optimal level. At this point the quotas would be eliminated, and all
fishermen, including the historical fishermen,would be subject to the harvest
royalties, set to maintain the stock at the optimal level. As technical im
provements (or the rising price ofa:iimal protein) encourage excessive fishing,
the royalties would be raised.
But it is not my intention here to provide a detailed blueprint
for management, so I will not dwell further on the possible institutional
aspects. Rather, my purpose has been to sketch the broad principles which,
as an economist concerned with the building of international community,
I believe should govern the management of ocean resources.

Footnotes
·1. Economists use the term "rent" to mean the reward above
costs of production to' anything that is scarce.
2. S. J. Holt, "The Food Resources of the Ocean," Scientific
American, 1969, No. 221, page 193; and James A. Crutchfield and Giulio
Pontecorvo, The Pacific Salmon Fisheries, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1969, p. 117. The 81 per cent cost allows for a 50 per cent assumed
increase in productivity in the salmon industry between the early thirties
and the late fifties. Additional examples can be found in Francis Christy,
Jr.,Alternative Arrangements for Marine Fisheries: An Overview, Washington:
Resources for the Future, 197 3, page 17.
3. See Appendix for a more formal statement of these relation
ships and the discussion that follows.
4. It may even make economic sense, conservationists will be
horrified to learn, to fish a species to extinction. For example, an isolated
community near starvation will have a high rate of discount and may eat
every fish it can catch. Happily this condition is not likely to obtain often.
5. As noted above, a sufficiently high discount rate may reverse
this relationship, and call for depletion of the stock below that required for
maximum sustainable yield.
6. These rough estimates are derived by supposing that about
half the ocean fisheries of the world are now either under (generally

inefficient) regulation already, or are being overfished, and by assuming (con
servatively-see the estimates cited earlier) that the average excessi\'e resource
cost on these fisheries is one-third. It has been estimated that the maximum
sustainable yield of fish from the oceans under existing environmental con
ditions is 200 million tons, compared with the 60-70 million tons now being
caught. See S. J. Holt, op. cit., page 188.
6. See J. L. McHugh, "Population Dynamics and Fisheries Man
agement," in Robert Thompson (ed.), Marine Fishery Resources, Oregon
State University, 1972, page 83. It is interesting to speculate on why this is
true, if it is true. It may be that domestic management schemes are domi
nated by producer groups with relatively short-term horizons, whereas ele
vation to the level of international dispute creates a need to impose at least
a semblance of rational management, for that is the easiest way for diplomats
to justify an international accord to their respective domestic constituencies.
7. A "fishery" in some instances would be a single species, in
others a region where a "biomass" of different species interacts. The choice
would be determined by ecological considerations in combination with eco
nomical fishing technology (e.g., whether the capacity exists to fish a single
species from a diverse fishing ground).
8. See D. F. Boesch, C.H. Hershner, and J. H. Milgram, Oil
Spills and the Marine Environment, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1.974.
9. Charles Pearson has suggested that disposal charges might be
an important source of revenue. He identifies two very different principles
on which to base charges : the first arises from negative external effects on
fisheries and other users, such as those discussed above; the second involves
charging a "monopoly rent" to those who want to use the ocean and have no
other low cost method of disposal. As Pearson recognizes, the second princi
ple would involve a misallocation of the world's resources, since the oceans
frequently do represent the channel of waste disposal that is socially least
expensive. So long as that is so, and for many materials it is likely to be so
for a long time, it would not be desirable to levy these monopoly rents.
See Pearson, "Extracting Rent from Ocean Resources: Discussion of a Neg
lected Source," Ocean Development and International Law Journal, vol. 1,
1973, pp. 221-237.
10. Malaysia and Indonesia have so far refused to do this in the
Straits of Malacca. Perhaps it will take the equivalent of a Torrey Canyon
disaster to move them to action. See E. F. Oliver, "Malacca: Dire Straits,"
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1973, pp. 27-33.
11. Denmark levied transit dues on ships in the Danish Sound
until 1857. They were scaled down and commuted into lump sum payments,
in exchange for Denmark's agreement to keep the Sound dredged and to
provide navigational aids. See _Charles E. Hill, The Danish Sound Dues and
the Command of the Baltic, Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1926,

pp. 282-285.
12. From the vantage point of the leading markets for a given
mineral, i.e., the area with the greatest deficit in supply, \Ve can construct a
"su-pply schedule" that will relate the various amounts that \Vil! be offered
to that market at varying prices. For minerals, the supply schedule will
generally be upward sloping, and the governing price P will be that which
just equates demand and supply, point Q in the figure. A producer at point
R on the global supply schedule will then earn a substantial scarcity rent on
his sales, ST on the assumption that the supply schedule includes the cost of
capital and some reward to risk-taking. We do not know yet whether deep
sea mining will be at a point like R or at a point like Q, where there is no
scarcity rent-or at both points, if the costs of seabed mining vary sub
stantially from place to place.
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APPENDIX

Simple Modelofa Fishery, and a Guide
to Optimum Management
Suppose the population dynamics of a single-species fishery can
be characterized by
(1)

s

f'(s) > o for s <. s*

f(s) = + h

f"(s) <. o
f•(s)

s

<.

o for s > s*

where s is the stock of fish, is the change in the stock per unit time, and h
is the harvest per unit time. This relationship is shown in Figure 1: h * is the
maximum sustainable yield, i.e., the largest harvest possible that will not

draw down the stock, and s* is the stock required to generate this yield.
(No distinction is made here between age-classes of the stock.) As the stock
gets larger, it is assumed to reached an ecological limit to its natural size.

+(s)

J.

st.ex.I<

Suppose the costs of fishing on this fishery can be characterized
by a cost function
(2)

C = C(h, s),

Cs ~ o, · C(o, s) = o

where Ch represents the incremental cost per unit of catch, stock being
held constant, and Cs represents the change in costs of a given harvest
resulting from an increase in the stock. In general, Ch and C5 will depend in
value both on the size of the stock and on the size of the harvest. This cost
function consolidates the cost functions of individual fishing units into a
relationship for the industry as a whole. In competitive equilibrium, margi
nal harvesting cost Ch will apply to each fishing unit, and will equal average
fishing costs (inclusive of normal return to capital), which are also affected
by the stock of fish.
Finally, suppose for the moment that the price of this fish to the
fishermen is fixed at a given value p for all points of time t in the future.
(3)

p(t) = p

This assumption will be relaxed below.
Under these circumstances, competitive access to the fishery will
lead to a level of fishing such that Ch = p, i.e., fishermen will increase
their harvesting effort until marginal cost equals price. For reasons that

will become clear below, this means that any fishery that is fished at all
vvill be "overfished," that is, fished somewhat beyond the economically
optimal point. We do not usually notice this overfishing, however, until
the price-cost incentives make it attractive to fish extensively and the fish
stock drops below the maximum sustainable yield level, s*. Harvesting may
take place at a point like J in Figure 1, in which case the stock will still be
declining (since harvesting there exceeds the natural growth in the stock),
or at a sustainable point such as K, assured either by regulation of harvests
or by a rise in Ch sufficient to keep harvesting at that level. Note that the
actuall harvest may be either above or below h *, but the sustainable harvest
will be below h * (except by coincidence). Moreover, the same sustainable
harvest could be achieved at lower cost if the stotk were larger.
The economically optimal harvest is that harvest that maximizes .
the present value of the fishery. We assume here that the only value of the
fishery is to produce fish. In that case, and on the other assumptions made
above,: we want to choose the stock s ** and the harvest h ** that maximizes

(4)
where i is the social rate of discount (here assumed to be constant over time),
which under carefully stipulated circumstances will equal the market rate of
interest on "riskless" assets.
Maximizing (4) is a problem in the calculus of variations and gives
rise to the Euler condition for maximizationt:

(5)

dCh

dt
This condition must be satisfied at all moments of time if (4) is to be maxi
mized.
The expression (5) requires some interpretation. The last term on
the right is transitory, diminishing to zero once the sustainable optimal
output has been reached. Moreover, during the transition to· the optimal
output this term is ambiguous in its sign; it will however generally mitigate
the impact of the second term on the right, but will not offset the second
term. For f' (s) < i the second term on the right-hand side will be positive.
That is, the marginal cost from a social point of view includes a term in
addition to Ch, and if fishermen have not taken this second term into account
tSee Kelvin Lancaster, Mathematical Economics, New York: Mac
Millan, 1968, pp. 377-380.

they will be indulging in excessive harvesting effort at Ch = p.
This second term, Cs
1
f' (s) - i
can be explained by considering the special case of s = s *, where f' (s) = o.
Then this term reduces to - Cs/i, the present discounted value of the extra
costs imposed for present and all future fishing by reducing the stock by
one unit. Where f' (s) >o (i.e., wheres< s *), this discount factor is augmented
by the positive productivity of an addition to the stock; where f• (s) <o (i.e.,
s >s*), the discount factor is diminished by the negative productivity of an
addition to the stock.
Equations ;(1) and (5) together determine the optimum _path for
harvesting the fishery, and equation (2) will give the costs associated with
the optimal path. So long as the optimum harvest as determined; by
equation (5) is below or above sustainable yield, the stock will increase or
decrease according to equation (1). Only when both jequations are satisfied
will there be an optimum sustainable harvest, and it will in general differ
from the maximum sustainable harvest. Figure 2 illustrates one plausible
set of relationships: f(s) is shown as in Figure 1, = Ig(s) represents the
solution of equation (5) for the optimum harvest 'S as a function of the
stock, neglecting the transitory term.

t

. h, s.

s4'
_F1.9. 2.

It originates on the s-axis at the value of s where f• (s) = i, from equation (5),
and rises to the right. If the fishery is initially fished at J, then the stock is
overfished and is falling. Figure 2 indicates that the harvest should be
at once to K, assuming no fixed costs of capital are associated with harvest
ing. At K, the stock will grow rapidly, and gradually the harvest should be
increased, until it reaches L, at which point the stock will no longer be
sustainable. Notice that the optimum harvest is below h * and the optimal
stock s ** exceeds s * here, in order to reduce the costs of harvesting

according to equation (2).
A higher interest rate will shift g(s) to the left and may push s * *
belows*. Indeed, a sufficiently high interest rate will push g(s) so far to the
left that it ceases to intersect f(s), in which case the optimum path involves
fishing the stock to extinction.
As unexpected increase in price will rotate g(s) counter-clockwise,
calling for a higher harvest immediately after the increase in price and a
decline in stock until a new equilibrium is reached.
In general, however, if prices are at or close to private marginal
costs and the discount rate is moderate at an overfished point such as J, the
optimal stock s * * will exceed s *.
The optimum path can be achieved through the imposition of
harvesting quotas. Or it can be achieved through the imposition of a
harvesting tax, T. Equation (5) indicates the amount of tax that will assure
optimal fishing under conditions of competition and entry unrestricted
except by the tax.
(6)

T(s) = __C_s_
f• (s) - i

at the optimum sustainable harvest.

The tax should be levied on each pound of fish caught. It will decline as
the stock of fish increases; T' (s) < o. But it will not decline to zero so long
as Cs differs from zero, i.e., so long as the size of the stock influences the
cost of harvesting.
A tax avoids the need for direct allocation of fishing rights and it
also generates revenue while encouraging efficiency.· An unexpected increase
in the price of fish, relative to costs, will lead optimally to an increase in
harvesting and a reduction of the stock. But it will also lead to an increase
in the optimal tax; the stimulus of higher pr"ices should be damped somewhat
by a higher tax.
The analysis above has made a number of strong simplifying
assumptions. It is possible to indicate how their relaxation will influence
the optimal path.
First, suppose the fishery as a whole faces a downward sloping
demand schedule, stationary over time, instead of the fixed price assumed
above. Then the optimization problem formulated in (4) should be reformu
lated to integrate the entire area under the demand schedule p(h) in the
maximand:

(7)

GO[r'-Jrh p(x)dx - C(h ,s) ] e -it dt

J

0

0

The resulti1;g optimal path is simibr in form to equation (5), except that
p now varies v,rith harvest levels instead of being constan t, and will also
appear in the transitory term. Allov,iing for the influence of han-est on
demand will moderate the changes required, e.g., from J to K in Figure 2.
It is sometimes said that the problem of fisheries arises from their
being "comm on proper ty" and that establishment of sole proprietorship over
each fishery would "internalize the externalities" and solve the problem . If
each fishery faces a downward sloping demand schedule this conten tion is
not correct if the sole proprietor is interested in maximizing revenues rather
than in maximizing social welfare, for he will formulate the maximizing
problem as
(8)

max

1•[

h · p (h) -C (h, s)] e•itdt

0

This is clearly different from (7) above, and leads to an "optim al"
sustainable yield harvest that calls for
(9)

Cs
p(h) + h · p' (h) = Ch + - 
f' (s) - i

.
The second term on the left-hand side of (9) is negative, the
reducti on in price that ·results from increasing the ·harvest. A monop olist
· looks at marginal revenue, not price, in making his output decisions. As
a
result, the re,·enue-ma:xirnizing sole proprie tor will hold harvests to a lower
level than would be socially optimal, and the fishery stock at a higher- than·
optimal level. He would also take into accoun t the second term on the
right-hand side of (9), thus internalizing the externality. The net result could
be either more or less efficient than uninhibited compe tition in use of the
fishery.
·
Second, no allowance has been made for capital costs involved in
fishing. If fishermen have invested in gear that do not have efficien
t
alternative uses, then the social objective might be recast to maximize the
the present value of the fishery plus the capital that has been invested in
fishing. With this revised objective, the optimal path from a point such as
J
in Figure 2 \\rill in general call for a less abrupt drop in harvest from an
initial point J. The drop in harvest (and hence the rebuilding of the stock)
will be more gradual, to aUow for gradual wearing out of the capital (although
cases can be found for which idling some specialized capital is socially
optimal). Similar modifications are required if retraining of fishermen is
necessary before they can find alternative employ ment.
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price of fish or in the cost of harvesting them. A secular rise in the demand
for fish, other things being equal, will increase the market-clearing price.
Technical improvements over time will reduce costs. ~oth of these effects
can be allowed for in a simplified way by replacing equations (2) and (3) with
(2')

C(t) = e-dt Co (h, s)

(3')

p(t) = poe

,..t

l >o
"' > 0

Under these conditions the optimal harvesting path of equation (5) becomes

(5')

p(t) = f' (s) -i + G Ch (t) +
f' (s) - i + tA-

Cs (t) +

d
dt
[ Ch(t)-p (t)]

f' (s) - i + t,t-

Here the prospective rise in prices at a rate 14 serves to offset the influence
of the interest rate_: higher interest rates call for more consumption in the
present, whereas higher}>- encourages deferment of harvesting now for the
sake of higher-valued harvests later.
The pr1\'ate marginal cost 2.t each point in time is Ch (t), and
the fishermen will attempt to equate this with price. Thus to achieve the
optimal path under cdmpetitive conditions in this case not only requires a
tax per unit catch equal to the second term on the right-hand side, the ex
tension of equation (6), but it also requires imposi::1.g a tax on the inputs or
effort used by the fishermen at a rate
(10)

r=

f'(s)-i-l
f' (s) -i +.,..

-1= f+t,L

i - t'- - f' (s)

to compensate for the "lack of foresight" on the part of fishermen with
respect to future costs and prices. In fact, each fisherman has no incentive
to postpone his harvesting, because of the common property characteristic
of the stock of fish. With the two taxes, the fisherman wilV have the appro
priate incentive to fish at the optimal level:
p(t) = (1 + r) Ch+ T (s)

